⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology

Wednesday, August 25, 2021 8:57:04 PM

What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology

A Brief History of Canada. Harry Potter : Peeves the Poltergeist is What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology literal spirit of chaos. The current movements of What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology, Essay On Parol Evidence Rule those of youth, while they necessarily reflect the peculiarities of their respective settings, manifest in their What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology this preoccupation with What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology as beings in the world and with What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology world—preoccupation with what and how they are "being. It had a king, but he did not have total power. Things are changing rapidly and this requires one to change with it or face the consequences. Violence is Sample Of Iep Essay by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognize others What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology persons—not by those who are oppressed, exploited, and unrecognized.

Technology Dependence

Lange et. However, that association has recently been challenged, as Kaiser notes:. Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, Job was predominantly classified as Wisdom literature. But then a strong voice of opposition arose claiming that Job was either utterly unique or it was in a lament genre, a form that was not firmly established until recently Kaiser, 8. Aben Ezra about A. He does note as well theories conjectures of contemporary to the events authors which would have authorship mainly in the Patriarchal period :. The most ingenious of the conjectures put forward is that of Dr.

Mill and Professor Lee, who think that Job himself put the discourses into a written form, and that Moses, having become acquainted with this work while he was in Midian, determined to communicate it to his countrymen, as analogous to the trial of their faith in Egypt; and, in order to render it intelligible to them, added the opening and concluding sections, which, it is remarked, are altogether in the style of the Pentateuch.

A far less probable theory assigns the authorship of the bulk of the book to Elihu Spence-Jones, xvi. Since the author is ultimately unknown, that does not help much with dating, and one's decisions about dating or authorship influence the conclusions one draws for the other. Harris believes dating of Ezekiel is fairly certain at roughly BC, and the mention of Job in that book , 20 affirms the work being at least prior to that Harris, 4. Indeed, the reference in Ezekiel assumes a familiarity with the person and his character, and thus assumes a general knowledge of the work.

Harris also mentions the similarity of Prov and Job typo in the article has it as Job as probably literary dependence Harris, 4. He states:. The wording of the two passages is identical in Hebrew, except that Job has the divine name, Shaddai, which it very frequently uses, and Proverbs uses the more common name, the Tetragram [YHWH]. Harris' final statement is odd, considering that it is commonly recognized that Shaddai is a far more ancient name and in fact Harris himself notes that later; Harris, 6 , and that Job's extensive use of it is one of the key earmarks of its antiquity.

Thus, it is far more likely Proverbs is quoting Job if there is any literary dependence at all. In some further discussion of parallels to Psalms and Proverbs with Job, Harris does admit on the literary relations:. Job [ sic ; should be corrected to Job ] and Psalm Many other parallels to Scripture are discussed in Harris' work and should be consulted for more info on those. He does end that summary with this thought emphasis added :. To sum up, there are a few interesting verbal parallels with Psalms, Proverbs, Isaiah, and the Balaam oracles. These are not conclusive, but incline somewhat toward a pre-monarchy date for the writing Harris, 5.

The writing of the book is best assigned to the age of Solomon [ca. There is nothing in the book, however, which conclusively refutes the ancient association of this book with Moses Smith, ch. Unger leans toward "Solomonic era" also Unger, , and Cabal et al. Lange et al. It is a legitimate conclusion It must almost certainly have been written before the promulgation of the Law. On the whole, therefore, it seems most reasonable to place the composition towards the close of the patriarchal period, not very long before the Exodus Spence-Jones, xv. In the absence of definite evidences for late dating and in view of numerous indications of a patriarchal milieu, it seems possible to hold to a Mosaic or slightly pre-Mosaic date in accord with much old Jewish and Christian sentiment.

We may therefore hold our conclusion provisionally expecting further light, especially from linguistic studies Harris, My view of Scripture's formation easily holds to the possibility of a very early, patriarchal date. There appears to be little real evidence to refute that, and in fact much of the linguistic, style, genre, and other such literary evidences show relationships to 2nd millennium works, which simply reinforces the possibility of that. But as I noted in the first heading, there is "no certain answer to give" on the date of its composition.

Alden, Robert L. Logos Bible Software. Ray Clendenen, Paul Copan, J. Moreland, and Doug Powell. Carson, D. France, J. Motyer, and G. Wenham, eds. New Bible Commentary: 21st Century Edition. Kaiser, Walter C. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures: Job. Smith, James E. The Wisdom Literature and Psalms. Old Testament Survey Series. NOTE: no page numbers are given in the electronic version of this book, so references are to the chapter. Spence-Jones, H. The Pulpit Commentary. Unger, Merrill F. Introductory Guide to the Old Testament. Zuck, Roy B. Walvoord, Roy B. Zuck, Dallas Theological Seminary. Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, Spence-Jones believes evidence "strongly favour the theory of its high antiquity" xiv , but composition is at least after Job's death, based on Job xv.

Unger says dating ranges from patriarchal times to as late as 3rd c. BC , while Cabal et. It should be noted that the work by Lange et. Zuck notes 9 marks Spence-Jones states, "manners, customs, institutions, and general mode of life described in the book are such as belong especially to the times which are commonly called 'patriarchal'," and further dates Job based on the approximate age he lived from Job by his "term of life two hundred to two hundred and fifty years would seem to place him in the period between Eber and Abraham, or at any rate in that between Eber and Jacob, who lived only a hundred and forty-seven years, and after whom the term of human life seems to have rapidly shortened" xv; similarly, see also Zuck, Also affirming patriarchal: Unger, He contends that nearly all of them are terms existing in Arabic," and Archer comments this would be expected given the location of Uz "somewhere in North Arabia" Also, Archer notes the antiquity of the name of Job as being 2nd millennium BC from other ancient documents I personally believe that these are truths the ancients knew much more about than we today might think they did, and that the truth of these ideas was lost among the rise of paganism after the tower of Babel spread the people abroad.

They become truths regained by the Israelites through God's revelation later in history. Charles A. Muenchow Philadelphia: Fortress, , p. As Harris warns, this tradition is even quite late in attestation—5th c. AD at the earliest Harris, I personally believe that Elihu is the most likely original author, as he is the only person not rebuked by God in the book perhaps indicating he is the most in-tune with God of all of them, even Job. Of course, I cannot prove that. Establishing the date for the Book of Job is difficult, not least because it clearly had at least two authors over a period of some centuries. Part of the book is poetic and another, quite distinct part is prose.

Some material appears to be post-exilic, but other parts reflect a much earlier belief system. This answer focuses on the Book of Job in the form it comes down to us today. Using several data of evidence from the book, we can establish a series of terminus post quem dates, the latest of which is most probable. Job NIV : So Satan went out from the presence of the Lord and afflicted Job with painful sores from the soles of his feet to the crown of his head. Deuteronomy : The Lord will afflict your knees and legs with painful boils that cannot be cured, spreading from the soles of your feet to the top of your head. Timothy K. As Beal points out, the overall implication is that the author of Job knew the Book of Deuteronomy.

Scholars generally agree that the Book of Deuteronomy originated as the 'book of law' supposedly found in the Temple during the seventh-century-BCE reign of King Josiah. A very similar case is reported in the Jeremiah chapter 36 , where a document was hidden then 'found' by the priests, in order to disguise its authorship. Bernard S. The scholarly consensus of the age of the Book of Deuteronomy gives us the terminus post quem for the Book of Job, at least in its final form, as the seventh century BCE. Whybray says in 'The social world of the wisdom writers', published in The World of Ancient Israel: Sociological, Anthropological and Political Perspectives , page , there is uncertainty about the date of the Book of Job, and even about the nationality of the author.

A date in the Persian period fifth or fourth century BCE is at present the most favoured one, but such estimates are always made with hesitation. The chief reasons usually given for a post-exilic date are the speculative nature of the book's theology, especially compared with the older parts of the Book of Proverbs, and the acquaintance of the author with other Old Testament writings such as Isaiah [written during the Exile]. Whybray says ibid , page the presence of the 'Satan' as a member of Yahweh's heavenly court is usually taken to be an indication that at least in its present form the story is post-exilic, since the only other references to that figure in the Old Testament Zechariah 3.

From the evidence presented here, the Book of Job is post-exilic, probably written in the fifth or fourth century BCE. Sign up to join this community. The best answers are voted up and rise to the top. Stack Overflow for Teams — Collaborate and share knowledge with a private group. Create a free Team What is Teams? Learn more. When was Job written? Who can better understand the necessity of liberation? They will not gain this liberation by chance but through the praxis of their quest for it, through their recognition of the necessity to fight for it.

And this fight, because of the purpose given it by the oppressed, will actually constitute an act of love opposing the lovelessness which lies at the heart of the oppressors violence, lovelessness even when clothed in false generosity. But almost always, during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or "sub-oppressors.

Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors. This is their model of humanity. This phenomenon derives from the fact that the oppressed, at a certain moment of their existential experience, adopt an attitude of "adhesion" to the oppressor. Under these circumstances they cannot "consider" him sufficiently clearly to objectivize him—to discover him "outside" themselves.

This does not necessarily mean that the oppressed are unaware that they are downtrodden. But their perception of themselves as oppressed is impaired by their submersion in the reality of oppression. At this level, their perception of themselves as opposites of the oppressor does not yet signify engagement in a struggle to overcome the contradiction; 2 the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to identification with its opposite pole. In this situation the oppressed do not see the "new man" as the person to be born from the resolution of this contradiction, as oppression gives way to liberation.

For them, the new man or woman themselves become oppressors. Their vision of the new man or woman is individualistic; because of their identification with the oppressor, they have no consciousness of themselves as persons or as members of an oppressed class. It is not to become free that they want agrarian reform, but in order to acquire land and thus become landowners—or, more precisely, bosses over other workers. It is a rare peasant who, once "promoted" to overseer, does not become more of a tyrant towards his former comrades than the owner himself.

This is because the context of the peasant's situation, that is, oppression, remains unchanged. In this example, the overseer, in order to make sure of his job, must be as tough as the owner—and more so. Thus is illustrated our previous assertion that during the initial stage of their struggle the oppressed find in the oppressor their model of "manhood. Even revolution, which transforms a concrete situation of oppression by establishing the process of liberation, must confront this phenomenon. Many of the oppressed who directly or indirectly participate in revolution intend—conditioned by the myths of the old order—to make it their private revolution.

The shadow of their former oppressor is still cast over them. The "fear of freedom" which afflicts the oppressed, 3 a fear which may equally well lead them to desire the role of oppressor or bind them to the role of oppressed, should be examined. One of the basic elements of the relationship between oppressor and oppressed is prescription. Every prescription represents the imposition of one individual's choice upon another, transforming the consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that conforms with the preservers consciousness.

Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior, following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor. The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearful of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject this image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility. Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion. To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognize its causes, so that through transforming action they can create a new situation, one which makes possible the pursuit of a fuller humanity.

But the struggle to be more fully human has already begun in the authentic struggle to transform the situation. Although the situation of oppression is a dehumanized and dehumanizing totality affecting both the oppressors and those whom they oppress, it is the latter who must, from their stifled humanity, wage for both the struggle for a fuller humanity; the oppressor, who is himself dehumanized because he dehumanizes others, is unable to lead this struggle. However, the oppressed, who have adapted to the structure of domination in which they are immersed, and have become resigned to it, are inhibited from waging the struggle for freedom so long as they feel incapable of running the risks it requires.

Moreover, their struggle for freedom threatens not only the oppressor, but also their own oppressed comrades who are fearful of still greater repression. When they discover within themselves the yearning to be free, they perceive that this yearning can be transformed into reality only when the same yearning is aroused in their comrades. But while dominated by the fear of freedom they refuse to appeal to others, or to listen to the appeals of others, or even to the appeals of their own conscience. They prefer gregariousness to authentic comradeship; they prefer the security of conformity with their state of unfreedom to the creative communion produced by freedom and even the very pursuit of freedom.

The oppressed suffer from the duality which has established itself in their innermost being. They discover that without freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet, although they desire authentic existence, they fear it. They are at one and the same time themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized. The conflict lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or being divided; between ejecting the oppressor within or not ejecting them; between human solidarity or alienation; between following prescriptions or having choices; between being spectators or actors; between acting or having the illusion of acting through the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated in their power to create and re-create, in their power to transform the world.

This is the tragic dilemma of the oppressed which their education must take into account. This book will present some aspects of what the writer has termed the pedagogy of the oppressed, a pedagogy which must be forged with , not for , the oppressed whether individuals or peoples in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity. This pedagogy makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come their necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation.

And in the struggle this pedagogy will be made and remade. The central problem is this: How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation? Only as they discover themselves to be "hosts" of the oppressor can they contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy. As long as they live in the duality in which to be is to be like , and to be like is to be like the oppressor , this contribution is impossible.

The pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization. Liberation is thus a childbirth, and a painful one. The man or woman who emerges is a new person, viable only as the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is superseded by the humanization of all people. Or to put it another way, the solution of this contradiction is born in the labor which brings into the world this new being: no longer oppressor nor longer oppressed, but human in the process of achieving freedom.

This solution cannot be achieved in idealistic terms. In order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle for their liberation, they must perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform. This perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for liberation; it must become the motivating force for liberating action. Nor does the discovery by the oppressed that they exist in dialectical relationship to the oppressor, as his antithesis— that without them the oppressor could not exist 4 —in itself constitute liberation.

The oppressed can overcome the contradiction in which they are caught only when this perception enlists them in the struggle to free themselves. The same is true with respect to the individual oppressor as a person. Discovering himself to be an oppressor may cause considerable anguish, but it does not necessarily lead to solidarity with the oppressed. Rationalizing his guilt through paternalistic treatment of the oppressed, all the while holding them fast in a position of dependence, will not do.

Solidarity requires that one enter into the situation of those with whom one is solidary; it is a radical posture. If what characterizes the oppressed is their subordination to the consciousness of the master, as Hegel affirms, 5 true solidarity with the oppressed means fighting at their side to transform the objective reality which has made them these "beings for another. True solidarity is found only in the plenitude of this act of love, in its existentiality, in its praxis.

To affirm that men and women are persons and as persons should be free, and yet to do nothing tangible to make this affirmation a reality, is a farce. Since it is a concrete situation that the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is established, the resolution of this contradiction must be objectively verifiable. Hence, the radical requirement—both for the individual who discovers himself or herself to be an oppressor and for the oppressed—that the concrete situation which begets oppression must be transformed. To present this radical demand for the objective transformation of reality, to combat subjectivist immobility which would divert the recognition of oppression into patient waiting for oppression to disappear by itself, is not to dismiss the role of subjectivity in the struggle to change structures.

On the contrary, one cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can exist without the other, nor can they be dichotomized. The separation of objectivity from subjectivity, the denial of the latter when analyzing reality or acting upon it, is objectivism. On the other hand, the denial of objectivity in analysis or action, resulting in a subjectivism which leads to solipsistic positions, denies action itself by denying objective reality. Neither objectivism nor subjectivism, nor yet psychologism is propounded here, but rather subjectivity and objectivity in constant dialectical relationship. To deny the importance of subjectivity in the process of transforming the world and history is naive and simplistic.

It is to admit the impossible: a world without people. This objectivistic position is as ingenuous as that of subjectivism, which postulates people without a world. World and human beings do not exist apart from each other, they exist in constant interaction. Marx does not espouse such a dichotomy, nor does any other critical, realistic thinker. What Marx criticized and scientifically destroyed was not subjectivity, but subjectivism and psychologism. Just as objective social reality exists not by chance, but as the product of human action, so it is not transformed by chance. If humankind produce social reality which in the "inversion of the praxis" turns back upon them and conditions them , then transforming that reality is an historical task, a task for humanity.

Reality which becomes oppressive results in the contradistinction of men as oppressors and oppressed. The latter, whose task it is to struggle for their liberation together with those who show true solidarity, must acquire a critical awareness of oppression through the praxis of this struggle. One of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation is that oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge human beings consiousness. To no longer be prey to its force, one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means of the praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it. Making "real oppression more oppressive still by adding to it the realization of oppression" corresponds to the dialectical relation between the subjective and the objective.

Only in this interdependence is an authentic praxis possible, without which it is impossible to resolve the oppressor-oppressed contradiction. To achieve this goal, the oppressed must confront reality critically, simultaneously objectifying and acting upon that reality. A mere perception of reality not followed by this critical intervention will not lead to a transformation of objective reality—precisely because it is not a true perception.

This is the case of a purely subjectivist perception by someone who forsakes objective reality and creates a false substitute. A different type of false perception occurs when a change in objective reality would threaten the individual or class interests of the perceiver. In the first instance, there is no critical intervention in reality because that reality is fictitious; there is none in the second instance because intervention would contradict the class interests of the perceiver. In the latter case the tendency of the perceiver is to behave "neurotically.

Thus it becomes necessary, not precisely to deny the fact, but to "see it differently. A fact which is not denied but whose truths are rationalized loses its objective base. It ceases to be concrete and becomes a myth created in defense of the class of the perceiver. Herein lies one of the reasons for the prohibitions and the difficulties to be discussed at length in Chapter 4 designed to dissuade the people from critical intervention in reality. The oppressor knows full well that this intervention would not be to his interest. What is to his interest is for the people to continue in a state of submersion, impotent in the face of oppressive reality. Of relevance here is Lukacs warning to the revolutionary party:. In affirming this necessity, Lukacs is unquestionably posing the problem of critical intervention.

The more the people unveil this challenging reality which is to be the object of their transforming action, the more critically they enter that reality. In this way they are "consciously activating the subsequent development of their experiences. In dialectical thought, world and action are intimately interdependent. But action is human only when it is not merely an occupation but also a preoccupation, that is, when it is not dichotomized from reflection. Reflection, which is essential to action, is implicit in Lukacs' requirement of "explaining to the masses their own action," just as it is implicit in the purpose he attributes to this explanation: that of "consciously activating the subsequent development of experience.

For us, however, the requirement is seen not in terms of explaining to, but rather dialoguing with the people about their actions. In any event, no reality transforms itself, 9 and the duty which Lukacs ascribes to the revolutionary party of "explaining to the masses their own action" coincides with our affirmation of the need for the critical intervention of the people in reality through the praxis. The pedagogy of the oppressed, which is the pedagogy of people engaged in the fight for their own liberation, has its roots here. And those who recognize, or begin to recognize, themselves as oppressed must be among the developers of this pedagogy. No pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant from the oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and by presenting for their emulation models from among the oppressors.

The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their redemption. The pedagogy of the oppressed, animated by authentic, humanist not humanitarian generosity, presents itself as a pedagogy of humankind. Pedagogy which begins with the egoistic interests of the oppressors an egoism cloaked in the false generosity of paternalism and makes of the oppressed the objects of its humanitarianism, itself maintains and embodies oppression. It is an instrument of dehumanization. This is why, as we affirmed earlier, the pedagogy of the oppressed cannot be developed or practiced by the oppressors. It would be a contradiction in terms if the oppressors not only defended but actually implemented a liberating education.

But if the implementation of a liberating education requires political power and the oppressed have none, how then is it possible to carry out the pedagogy of the oppressed prior to the revolution? This is a question of the greatest importance, the reply to which is at least tentatively outlined in Chapter 4. One aspect of the reply is to be found in the distinction between systematic education , which can only be changed by political power, and educational projects , which should be carried out with the oppressed in the process of organizing them.

The pedagogy of the oppressed, as a humanist and libertarian pedagogy, has two distinct stages. In the first, the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation. In the second stage, in which the reality of oppression has already been transformed, this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a pedagogy of all people in the process of permanent liberation. In both stages, it is always through action in depth that the culture of domination is culturally confronted.

The pedagogy of the first stage must deal with the problem of the oppressed consciousness and the oppressor consciousness, the problem of men and women who oppress and men and women who suffer oppression. It must take into account their behavior, their view of the world, and their ethics. A particular problem is the duality of the oppressed: they are contradictory, divided beings, shaped by and existing in a concrete situation of oppression and violence. Any situation in which "A" objectively exploits "B" or hinders his and her pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person is one of oppression. Such a situation in itself constitutes violence, even when sweetened by false generosity, because it interferes with the individual's ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human.

With the establishment of a relationship of oppression, violence has already begun. Never in history has violence been initiated by the oppressed. How could they be the initiators, if they themselves are the result of violence? How could they be the sponsors of something whose objective inauguration called forth their existence as oppressed? There would be no oppressed had there been no prior situation of violence to establish their subjugation.

Violence is initiated by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognize others as persons—not by those who are oppressed, exploited, and unrecognized. It is not the unloved who initiate disaffection, but those who cannot love because they love only themselves. It is not the helpless, subject to terror, who initiate terror, but the violent, who with their power create the concrete situation which begets the "rejects of life. It is not the despised who initiate hatred, but those who despise. It is not those whose humanity is denied them who negate humankind, but those who denied that humanity thus negating their own as well.

Force is used not by those who have become weak under the preponderance of the strong, but by the strong who have emasculated them. For the oppressors, however, it is always the oppressed whom they obviously never call "the oppressed" but—depending on whether they are fellow countrymen or not—"those people" or "the blind and envious masses" or "savages" or "natives" or "subversives" who are disaffected, who are "violent," "barbaric," "wicked," or "ferocious" when they react to the violence of the oppressors. Yet it is—paradoxical though it may seem—precisely in the response of the oppressed to the violence of their oppressors that a gesture of love may be found.

Consciously or unconsciously, the act of rebellion by the oppressed an act which is always, or nearly always, as violent as the initial violence of the oppressors can initiate love. Whereas the violence of the oppressors prevents the oppressed from being fully human, the response of the latter to this violence is grounded in the desire to pursue the right to be human. As the oppressors dehumanize others and violate their rights, they themselves also become dehumanized.

As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors power to dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had lost in the exercise of oppression. It is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors. The latter, as an oppressive class, can free neither others nor themselves. It is therefore essential that the oppressed wage the struggle to resolve the contradiction in which they are caught; and the contradiction will be resolved by the appearance of the new man: neither oppressor nor oppressed, but man in the process of liberation.

If the goal of the oppressed is to become fully human, they will not achieve their goal by merely reversing the terms of the contradiction, by simply changing poles. This may seem simplistic; it is not. Resolution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction indeed implies the disappearance of the oppressors as a dominant class. However, the restraints imposed by the former oppressed on their oppressors, so that the latter cannot reassume their former position, do not constitute oppression.

An act is oppressive only when it prevents people from being more fully human. Accordingly, these necessary restraints do not in themselves signify that yesterdays oppressed have become today's oppressors. However, the moment the new regime hardens into a dominating "bureaucracy" 11 the humanist dimension of the struggle is lost and it is no longer possible to speak of liberation. Hence our insistence that the authentic solution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction does not lie in a mere reversal of position, in moving from one pole to the other.

Nor does it lie in the replacement of the former oppressors with new ones who continue to subjugate the oppressed—all in the name of their liberation. But even when the contradiction is resolved authentically by a new situation established by the liberated laborers, the former oppressors do not feel liberated. On the contrary, they genuinely consider themselves to be oppressed. Conditioned by the experience of oppressing others, any situation other than their former seems to them like oppression.

Formerly, they could eat, dress, wear shoes, be educated, travel, and hear Beethoven; while millions did not eat, had no clothes or shoes, neither studied nor traveled, much less listened to Beethoven. Any restriction on this way of life, in the name of the rights of the community, appears to the former oppressors as a profound violation of their individual rights—although they had no respect for the millions who suffered and died of hunger, pain, sorrow, and despair. For the oppressors, "human beings" refers only to themselves; other people are "things.

And they make this concession only because the existence of the oppressed is necessary to their own existence. This behavior, this way of understanding the world and people which necessarily makes the oppressors resist the installation of a new regime is explained by their experience as a dominant class. Once a situation of violence and oppression has been established, it engenders an entire way of life and behavior for those caught up in it—oppressors and oppressed alike. Both are submerged in this situation, and both bear the marks of oppression. Analysis of existential situations of oppression reveals that their inception lay in an act of violence—initiated by those with power.

This violence, as a process, is perpetuated from generation to generation of oppressors, who become its heirs and are shaped in its climate. This climate creates in the oppressor a strongly possessive consciousness—possessive of the world and of men and women. Apart from direct, concrete, material possession of the world and of people, the oppressor consciousness could not understand itself—could not even exist.

Fromm said of this consciousness that, without such possession, "it would lose contact with the world. The earth, property, production, the creations of people, people themselves, time—everything is reduced to the status of objects at its disposal. In their unrestrained eagerness to possess, the oppressors develop the conviction that it is possible for them to transform everything into objects of their purchasing power; hence their strictly materialistic concept of existence. Money is the measure of all things, and profit the primary goal. For the oppressors, what is worthwhile is to have more—always more—even at the cost of the oppressed having less or having nothing.

For them, to be is to have and to be the class of the "haves. As beneficiaries of a situation of oppression, the oppressors cannot perceive that if having is a condition of being , it is a necessary condition for all women and men. This is why their generosity is false. Humanity is a "thing," and they possess it as an exclusive right, as inherited property. To the oppressor consciousness, the humanization of the "others," of the people, appears not as the pursuit of full humanity, but as subversion.

The oppressors do not perceive their monopoly on having more as a privilege which dehumanizes others and themselves. They cannot see that, in the egoistic pursuit of having as a possessing class, they suffocate in their own possessions and no longer are ; they merely have. For them, having more is an inalienable right, a right they acquired through their own "effort," with their "courage to take risks. Precisely because they are "ungrateful" and "envious," the oppressed are regarded as potential enemies who must be watched.

It could not be otherwise. If the humanization of the oppressed signifies subversion, so also does their freedom; hence the necessity for constant control. And the more the oppressors control the oppressed, the more they change them into apparently inanimate "things. Sadistic love is a perverted love—a love of death, not of life. One of the characteristics of the oppressor consciousness and its necrophilic view of the world is thus sadism. As the oppressor consciousness, in order to dominate, tries to deter the drive to search, the restlessness, and the creative power which characterize life, it kills life. More and more, the oppressors are using science and technology as unquestionably powerful instruments for their purpose: the maintenance of the oppressive order through manipulation and repression.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. However, what keeps her out of falling into the True What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology of her new associates What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology that she still retains her reckless, independent streak and has not yet succumbed to percy jackson monsters What Does Technology Cause Peoples Dependence On Technology Is Illegal ethos of the Faceless Men. Annual Review of Anthropology.

Web hosting by Somee.com